What he said. . .
Rob over at Lawyers, Guns and Money keeps making sense:
Who’s Winning in Anbar?
One can rarely peruse a right wing blog these days without reading about how “we’re winning” in Anbar. The talking point stems from the decision, in September of last year, of a number of tribal elites in Anbar to focus on operations against Al Qaeda, instead of against the United States military. As Jim Henley notes, crafting an alliance with tribal elites is hardly without risk, and does not constitute “victory” in any meaningful sense for the United States.
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Having accepted defeat in the main aim of the war, collaboration with Sunni tribal elites is probably the next best option. The victory isn’t ours, though; it’s theirs. Al Qaeda wasn’t in Anbar before the war, and it may be gone from Anbar someday, but the Sunni tribal leaders have maintained and perhaps even increased their autonomy. . . . Rather than create a shining example for the Middle East, US policy is now directed towards enabling the most conservative elements of Iraqi society. The truly sad thing is that this does, compared with the execution of the first three years of the war, represent something of a victory.
The other point I would make is that the current rationale offered by Bush for perpetuating this was is the al Qaeda gambit — the notion that al Qaeda will turn Iraq into the “Caliphate” if we leave.
As noted earlier, al Qaeda has always had thin support in Iraq among the populace, even among Sunnis with whom they are nominally allied because of their support in fighting American troops. If al Qaeda cannot garner support in Anbar, the most radicalized and violent Sunni province, how are they a threat to control a country which is 80% Shiite and Kurd, both of whom loathe al Qaeda? The only reason al Qaeda was tolerated in Anbar the first place was because of our presence. Yet somehow returning Anbar to status quo ante represents a victory, even if the mechanism is otherwise antithetical to every other aim of this misbegotten war.
