What the Neo Cons WANT the NIE to say. . .

or, chugging the Neocon lemonade.

Fred Kagan, one of the original neocon Iraqi war pimps, who also had a hand in the current “surge” strategy, writes an op-ed, What The NIE Really Says on the National Intelligence Estimate. The NIE was widely reported to show grave concerns about the viability of Iraq’s government headed by Nouri al Maliki, and hence the viability of a strategy which expends American lives for a marginal improvement in Iraq’s security in the hopes that Iraq’s government would make progress in solving the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal divisions which contribute to the massive violence and lack of unity in the country. Kagan chides the media for its putative willingness to “quote selectively” in order to show that the surge’s incremental security improvements are accompanied only by political failures:

It claimed that, “Implicitly, at least, the report questioned whether Mr. Maliki is willing or able to help the new Iraq become a fully functioning country.” There is actually no basis in the declassified report for this statement.

Kagan, while ironically complaining that the Librul Media was selectively quoting the NIE, argues that the document only mentions “mentions Maliki in four places” none of which support the proposition that Maliki is willing to take the steps necessary to achieve any meaningful political progress which would justify the loss of American lives Kagan is so willing to spend. Yet Kagan ignores multiple statements which expand upon the reluctance or resistance of Maliki’s Shia-led government to the steps needed to move toward political reconciliation needed to make Iraq a functioning country:

The IC assesses that the emergence of “bottom-up” security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. . . . We also assess that under some conditions “bottom-up initiatives” could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.

Get that? The “best prospect” for improved security won’t contribute to enduring stability unless the Iraqi Government — that is, Maliki’s government — will accept and support the initiative, which involves arming and empowering his Sunni enemies.

Yet in the mind of the increasingly desperate Neocon, there is nothing in the NIE to indicate that Maliki might be unwilling or unable to take the steps which the NIE believes are necessary to achieve security or reconciliation.

One of the references in the NIE is described by Kagan as “‘divisions between Maliki and the Sadrists have increased’ (which is a good thing, by the way)” but Kagan disingenuously reduces the substance of this reference, which is far more comprehensive and significant, and includes not just the Sadrists but all the significant players in Maliki’s increasingly moribund coalition:

The IC assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the
Unified Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Divisions between Maliki and the Sadrists have increased, and Shia factions have explored alternative coalitions aimed at constraining Maliki.

It’s not just the Sadrists, but also Sistani’s movement, which is the largest in the country, and the UIA, the largest secular party, and Kurdish parties. Our bloated neocon’s attempt to minimize this reference to a mere split between Maliki and Sadr is dishonest and asinine. One doesn’t need to refer to the NIE to know that Maliki’s government is splintered. One just has to read the paper:

3 Secular Iraqis in Cabinet to Formally Resign

Escalating a political crisis that has paralyzed the Iraqi government, three secular cabinet members will formally resign Saturday, according to a senior member of the group.

The Iraqi National List, an umbrella group of several political parties composed of secular Sunnis and Shiites, had boycotted cabinet meetings since Aug. 7 because of frustrations with what they saw as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s divisive leadership style. The party, headed by former prime minister Ayad Allawi, will now submit the official resignations, National List member Iyad Jamal al-Deen said.

Sunni ministers resign from Iraq Cabinet

Baghdad shook with bombings and political upheaval Wednesday as the largest Sunni Arab bloc quit the government and a suicide attacker blew up his fuel tanker in one of several attacks that claimed 142 lives nationwide.

The Iraqi Accordance Front’s withdrawal from the Cabinet leaves only two Sunnis in the 40-member body, undermining Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s efforts to pull together rival factions and pass reconciliation laws the U.S. considers benchmarks that could lead to sectarian reconciliation.

If anyone is reading the NIE selectively to support his position — and the surge is his position ab initio — it is Kagan. But he is just following a family tradition in being wrong and disingenuous on IIraq. His brother, Robert, is one of the leading lights dim bulbs in the Project for a New American Century, the leading booster for the invade-Iraq-and-be-greeted-as-liberators school of Foreign Policy/Fantasy Fiction. He is currently insisting that the “surge” is working because he is one of the authors of the miserably failing strategy. But, as Bill Kristol proves, insisting that failure is success is one of the hallmarks of PNAC/AEI argumentation. These are the people, after all, who lauded Ahmed Chalabi as the future George Washington of Iraq, and praised the value of the “false and in some cases deliberately misleading” (Colin Powell’s words, not mine) intelligence fabricated by Chalabi’s organization which the PNAC and the other war pimps used to push the invasion of Iraq in the first place.