Because things have gone so well in Anbar. . .

Watching Bush cling to Anbar as a model for success is sad enough, but now the Pentagon and the war pimps are trying to sell the idea that alliances with tribal leaders can solve the problem of a violent and fragmenting Iraq:

“KUT, Iraq — American commanders in southern Iraq say Shiite sheiks are showing interest in joining forces with the U.S. military against extremists, in much the same way that Sunni clansmen in the western part of the country have worked with American forces against Al Qaeda.”

Because, you know, we’re so popular in Anbar now:

In a survey conducted Aug. 17-24 for ABC News, the BBC and NHK, the Japanese broadcaster, among a random national sample of 2,212 Iraqis, 72 percent in Anbar expressed no confidence whatsoever in United States forces. Seventy-six percent said the United States should withdraw now — up from 49 percent when we polled there in March, and far above the national average.

Withdrawal timetable aside, every Anbar respondent in our survey opposed the presence of American forces in Iraq — 69 percent “strongly” so. Every Anbar respondent called attacks on coalition forces “acceptable,” far more than anywhere else in the country. All called the United States-led invasion wrong, including 68 percent who called it “absolutely wrong.” No wonder: Anbar, in western Iraq, is almost entirely populated by Sunni Arabs, long protected by Saddam Hussein and dispossessed by his overthrow.

Although residents of Anbar, like most Iraqis, loathe al Qaeda even more than they loathe us, and have for a long time.

It seems that tribal leaders are the last, best hope for proponents of the war, and yet a thin reed to grasp:

Indeed, one other result from our poll may be of particular interest to Anbar’s tribal leaders and the United States military alike: Just 23 percent in Anbar expressed confidence in their “local leaders”; 77 percent had little or none. That’s better than it was in March — but still nearly the lowest level of confidence in local leaders we measured anywhere in Iraq.

These numbers suggest that, at best, any alliance between the US occupation and the Anbar tribal leaders is purely the result of a common enemy: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Once that common enemy is gone, these tribal sheiks will have likely turn on their remaining enemies — the foremost of which happens to be us.