Heckuva job, Bushie

Five years after Bush invaded Iraq with the intention of installing Ahmed Chalabi as his satrap, McClatchy’s Washington Bureau poses the question: Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?

One of the most powerful men in Iraq isn’t an Iraqi government official, a militia leader, a senior cleric or a top U.S. military commander or diplomat,

He’s an Iranian general, and at times he’s more influential than all of them.

Brig. Gen. Qassem Suleimani commands the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, an elite paramilitary and espionage organization whose mission is to expand Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

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Suleimani’s role in Iraq illustrates how President Bush’s decision to topple Saddam has enabled Shiite, Persian Iran to extend its influence in Iraq, frustrating U.S, aims there, alarming America’s Sunni Arab allies in the Persian Gulf and prompting new Israeli fears about Iran’s ambitions.

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In Iraq, Iran’s chief ally has been the Badr Organization, formerly the paramilitary wing of what’s now the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the country’s largest Shiite political party. During the Iran-Iraq war, Badr operated as a wing of the Iranian military; after the toppling of Saddam, Badr members infiltrated the security forces and were believed to be responsible for torturing and killing jailed Sunnis.

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One of Suleimani’s first major victories against the United States in Iraq, however, was the product of political shrewdness, not military force. It came in January 2005, when Iraqis voted for the first time since Saddam’s ouster nearly two years earlier.

The Bush administration pulled out all the stops to keep secular, pro-Western interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi in office, aiding him with broadcast airtime, slick campaign ads and veteran advisers.

Suleimani countered with a covert PR campaign on behalf of a bloc of conservative pro-Iran Shiites that he helped assemble, and he sent printing presses, consultants and broadcasting equipment, said a senior Iraqi official who’s known Suleimani for years. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive relationship between Iraq and Iran.

When the ballots were counted, Bush pointed to the purple-dyed fingers of Iraqi voters as a triumph for democracy — but Allawi and his bloc were out and Iran’s allies were in.

Allawi was the administration’s choice to replace Chalabi as their choice to run Iraq — until he was badly defeated in elections which brought the pro-Iranian D’awa and ISCI political groups to power, along with Sadr’s political organization.

And while the administration continues to push a storyline which places Sadr and Iran on the side of evil and the government of Nouri al Maliki and his allies on our side of good, not only are is the Badr organization affiliated with Maliki’s government among Iran’s closest allies (having fought as part of the Iranian military) al Maliki’s own ascendence may have been the result of General Suleimani’s mediation between competing Iraqi Shiite factions, all of which Iran may own a piece.

Bush has effectively disintegrated the cornerstone principles of American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. Prior to 1979, the US relied on Iran to act as regional policeman and counterbalance Iraq and socialist arab regimes perceived to be Soviet client states in the region.

After the fall of the Shah and the ascendance of Islamic radicals in Tehran, we shifted support to Iraq, intervening to keep the Straights of Hormuz open and Iraqi oil flowing to market. In both instances, Iraq and Iran were a counterbalance against the other.

In the wake of our invasion, and the progressive disintegration of Iraq as a country into sectarian and ethnic components, Iran now stands to remain a dominant player in the politics of the Shiite majority; Iran’s regional enemy has not only been destroyed, the majority of its people and resources are poised to become its most substantial ally.